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Abstract
Permits markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow (i)
firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and (ii) the regulator to dis-
tribute the burden in a politically desirable way. These two concerns, how-
ever, may conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating the regulator’s future
desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them, firms purchase
permits to signal their need. This raises the price above marginal costs and
the market becomes inefficient. If the social cost of pollution is high and the
government intervenes frequently in the market, the distortions are greater
than the gains from trade and non-tradable permits are better. The analysis
helps to understand permit markets and how they should be designed.
Keywords: Tradable permits, time inconsistency, the ratchet effect,
rent-seeking, plan vs.market
1. Introduction
We analyze a model where a planner, in each period, allocates a good
according to some welfare function, after which the agents can trade these
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endowments in a market. The planner cannot commit to future allocation-
rules and it does not know the agents’ types, but the pattern of trade may
reveal some information. We derive the equilibrium allocation, the market
equilibrium, and conditions under which the distortions in the market out-
weights the gains from trade.
The model is not only of theoretical interest; it is designed to resemble
markets for pollution permits. Understanding permit markets is important
since they are increasingly employed to regulate water use, fishing and pol-
lution.1 Since tradable permits were first analyzed by Crocker (1966), Dales
(1968) and Montgomery (1972), the typical view has been that ”in terms of
production efficiency, the tradable quota system is equivalent to that of the
Pigouvian tax” (Sandmo, 2000, p. 64). Moreover, the government can dis-
tribute the permits just as it pleases because the initial distribution does not
affect the equilibrium allocation in a perfect market. Since tradable permits
appear to combine the concern for efficiency with the government’s concern
for redistribution, it is celebrated as a policy instrument.
To date, the most extensive permit market is the Emission Trading Sys-
tem (ETS) for carbon dioxide in the European Union (EU). The ETS has a
number of characteristics consistent with our model. First, the governments
do distribute the permits periodically. The ETS was initiated in January,
2005, and permits were first distributed to more than 12,000 large point
sources in 25 countries. By 2008, the governments distributed permits again,
1To fix ideas, we are consistently referring to pollution permits throughout this paper.
For an overview of ”individual transferable quotas” in fishing, see Hannesson (2004).
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this time for a period of five years.2 Second, the permits are, for the most
part, distributed for free. In the first phase, national governments were
obliged to distribute 95% of the permits for free, and only Denmark used the
option of auctioning the remaining 5%. For the second phase, at least 90% of
the permits had to be distributed for free, but in every country the fraction
was higher. For the U.S. Clean Air Act, ”Allowances were given to utilities
rather than sold because there was no way that a sales-based program could
have passed Congress” (Schmalensee et al., 1998, p. 56). Quite generally,
Tietenberg (2006, p. 72) notes that: ”free distribution of permits (as op-
posed to auctioning them off) seems to be a key ingredient in the successful
implementation of emissions trading programs”.3 Third, when distributing
the permits, governments rely on projections for future need, at least to
some extent. Summarizing the allocation process in the EU, Ellerman et al.
(2007, p. 347) observe ”projections became necessary because no Member
State wished to deviate far from expected emissions in deciding the total to
allocate to installations”. In fact, the EU (Directive 2003/87/EC) requests
that ”Member States should have regard when allocating allowances to the
potential for industrial process activities to reduce emissions”. Fourth, gov-
ernments do not directly observe the firms’ needs. ”The lack of data at the
2In addition, ”In some Member States a strong desire existed that if it turned out
ex post that an installation needed more allowances or had reduced needs, the govern-
ment would correct upwards or downwards the number of allowances allocated to such
installations” (Zapfel, 2007, p. 32). Both Germany and the UK allowed for such ex post
adjustments.
3Stavins (1998, p. 74-75) supports this: ”when market-based instruments have been
adopted in the United States, they have virtually always taken the form of tradeable
permits rather than emission taxes”; ”Moreover, the initial allocation of such permits has
always been through free initial distribution, rather than through auctions”.
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level of the installation was perhaps the biggest problem confronted in the
allocation process by nearly all Member States” (Ellerman et al., 2007, p.
339).
This paper presents a simple multi-period model in which, in each period,
the government distributes permits and the firms trade. The government can-
not commit to future policies, implying that it distributes the permits just
as it pleases in every period. With a concave social welfare function, the
government prefers to distribute the permits for free, and it prefers to give
more permits to firms that are likely to face high costs when reducing emis-
sions. In reality, cost implications of emissions limits can determine whether
firms go under, workers are laid off or production moves overseas. While the
government does not observe the firms’ costs directly, the pattern of trade
reveals some information, and the government updates its beliefs accordingly.
Naturally, ”governments will inevitably find it hard to ignore the latest in-
formation on emissions” when distributing the permits.4 Anticipating this,
firms purchase more permits than what they would find optimal in a static
setting, thereby signaling their need for permits. This raises the permit price
above marginal costs, and the market ends up being distorted. Since only
high-cost firms will signal successfully in equilibrium, high-cost firms pollute
too much while low-cost firms pollute too little. We show that the distor-
tions are larger if the period-length is short and the value of permits large.
Thus, more important environmental problems require that the government
commit not to intervene for a larger number of years. Otherwise, the distor-
tions in the market can be so large that the gains from trade are at risk, and
4Quoted from Grubb and Neuhoff (2006, p. 16).
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that it is better to abandon the market entirely and instead require uniform
quotas. In sum: a combination of market and regulation can be worse than
either alternative isolated.
There is not a lot of data due to the short history of tradable permits
in practice, and many of the studies are based on experiments and simula-
tions. These studies have suggested that the gains from trade are huge, with
cost-savings that in some cases exceed 90 percent of the abatement costs com-
pared to command-and-control (Carlson et al., 2000; Burtraw et al., 2005).
Compared with observed abatement, however, Tietenberg (2006) finds that
only parts of the estimated savings are realized. Our theory contributes to
explaining this puzzle by indicating that the gains may be reduced by signal-
ing costs. The problem has indeed been recognized in practice: Peter Zapfel
(2007, p. 36) in the European Commission notes that ”The downside of pe-
riodic allocation is that companies may adopt strategic behavior in order to
maximize the number of free allowances to be allocated in future rounds”.
Normatively, our analysis issues a warning to the combination of trade and
a frequent redistribution of free pollution permits. The warning is more im-
portant for the EU’s ETS, where each period has been only 3-5 years long.
In the American sulfur dioxide market, on the other hand, the distributed
allowances are long-lasting. While free, long-lasting permits may be provoca-
tive, based on our model, the U.S. market ought to be more efficient than
the ETS. Our recommendations also conflict with the traditional view that
frequent reallocation is beneficial to ensure flexibility.5
5For example, Noll (1982, p. 123) wrote that ”reissuing permits...gives regulators
continuing opportunities to adjust total emissions.” For similar reasons, A˚hman et al.
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Our dynamic model breaks the aforementioned ”equivalence” between
tradable permits and Pigou taxes.6 This way, we contribute to the litera-
ture on policy instruments in general7 and the one on tradable permits, in
particular.8 The literature on ”grandfathering” emission rights rests on the
assumption that the initial permit allocation is a direct function of historic
emissions (e.g. Neuhoff et al., 2005). This makes it more attractive to pol-
lute, the permit price increases, but the market allocation is nevertheless
efficient (Bo¨hringer and Lange, 2005).9
Our two contributions to this literature are to endogenize its key assump-
tion and show that the efficiency result no longer holds. Unlike the literature
on grandfathering, we do not assume that governments are backward-looking
- that occurs in equilibrium since past emission is an indication of future
needs. The pursuit for permits is then taking the form of signaling, creating
distortions in the market and breaking the equivalence to a tax.
(2007) recommend a 10-year cycle for permits.
6A commitment to uniform emission taxes (and no transfers to the firms) would im-
plement the first best in our model, as will become clear below.
7See Baumol and Oates (1988) or Cropper and Oates (1992) for overviews. Buchanan
and Tullock (1975) observed that it is more politically acceptable to distribute quotas for
free, as this is viewed as less confiscatory. Also Bovenberg et al. (2005, 2008) assume
that the government may want to compensate firms for the regulatory burden. If raising
revenues lead to deadweight losses, the ranking of instruments can be affected and quotas
may be preferred to taxes.
8While often presumed to be efficient and equivalent to a Pigou tax, permit markets
may be inefficient if the permits are distributed non-cooperatively by multiple districts
(Helm, 2003) or if some firms have market power (Hahn, 1984). The firms may then be
able to collude and trade in a way that induces the government to issue a larger total
number of permits in the next period (Andersson, 1997). Moledina et al. (2003) observe
that the firms have incentives to raise the permit price to get more permits in the future,
but they assume there are only two firms, no firm-specific uncertainty, and the government
does not realize that firms are strategic.
9Exceptions arise if costs increase rapidly or the firms can borrow quotas over time
(Rosendahl, 2008).
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The paper also contributes to contract theory, in particular the literature
on the “ratchet effect” (surveyed by Laffont and Tirole, 1993, Ch. 9). Like
us, this literature assumes that the planner does not know the firm’s type,
and it cannot commit to future actions. Laffont and Tirole motivate this
by referring to incomplete contracts, while Freixas et al. (1985) suggest a
commitment would not be credible, for example because the planner may
be replaced. The planner provides an incentive scheme that may or may
not separate the types. If the discount factor is large, separating two types
becomes more costly since a firm anticipates that the incentive scheme may
be altered when its type is revealed; pooling may then be cheaper for the
planner. While our model of the firm is similar,10 we relax the assumption
that the planner fixes an incentive scheme. This is related to our timing,
where the government acts before the types are realized. Instead, we allow for
several firms and we let them trade the permits in a market. Firms anticipate
the ratchet effect - that their action may influence future quotas - and this
gives rise to a market failure. In contrast to the principal-agent literature,
the planner cannot specify a finite menu (with only two choices), and the
Intuitive Criterion implies that the market equilibrium is always separating.
The temptation to pool the types in the traditional literature induces the
planner to prohibit trading in our model.11 Since our equilibrium is always
10Also Laffont and Tirole and Freixas et al. emphasize the model with two types and
quadratic costs.
11Relatedly, Bisin and Rampini (2006) show how anonymous markets for capital help
the government to implement time consistent tax policies. Anonymous markets would
help also in our model, in principle, but when firms are trading the right to provide public
bads, it is necessary that a regulator controls and monitors that emissions do not exceed
the permits. This makes anonymous pollution markets less realistic in our setting.
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in separating strategies, a multi-period model is more tractable than if the
planner used incentive schemes. We can then show, for example, that the
distortions in the market (i.e., the cost of separating the types) are larger if
the types are highly correlated across time. This is conjectured, but left as
an open question, by Laffont and Tirole (p. 414).
Our finding that a uniform quota allocation might be preferable to avoid
costly signaling is also detected by Harstad (2007). That paper analyzes
negotiations between districts and signaling generates delay. In this paper, by
contrast, signaling distorts the market. Furthermore, our model is dynamic
and emphasizes the time inconsistency problem detected by Kydland and
Prescott (1977). Thus, uniform policies are achieved only by abandoning the
market.
The next section presents the two-period version of the model. Section 3
solves the model, and finds that while the last period implements the first
best, the market may be distorted in the first. We derive simple conditions
under which the distortions outweight the gains from trade, such that non-
tradable permits would be better. The distortions in the first period prevail
if there are more periods; Section 4 shows that the results from the two-
period model survive even if the number of periods is infinite. The model
is deliberately kept simple, but Section 5 argues that it is robust to several
generalizations. The final section concludes, while the Appendix contains all
proofs.
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2. The Two-Period Model
2.1. The Agents
There is a large number of similar firms, approximated by a continuum
I = [0, 1] of mass one. The gross profit of each firm i ∈ I depends on
a constant κ minus a quadratic cost of abating or reducing pollution, κ −
(θi − xi)2 /2. A firm’s type is given by θi, while xi is i’s level of pollution.
With no restrictions on xi, firm i would set xi = θi. θi can thus be interpreted
as firm i’s ”business as usual” emission. Moreover, θi−xi is not only firm i’s
abatement level, but also its marginal benefit of polluting or, equivalently,
its marginal cost of abating or reducing pollution. A firm that has a ”high
cost” of reducing emission (large θi) prefers to pollute more.
To keep the model simple, θi ∈
{
θ, θ
}
and Pr (θi = θ) = k ∈ (0, 1) in
period 1. The only linkage between the periods is that firm types are partially
persistent: For each firm i, its type in the second period is stable, and thus
the same as that in the current period, with probability s ∈ (0, 1). With
probability 1 − s, however, the firm’s type is randomly drawn again (by
Nature) with the same probability distribution as in period 1. Thus, if θi is
i’s type in period 1, its type in period 2 is θ+i , given by:
Pr
(
θ+i = θ
)
=
{
s+ (1− s)k if θi = θ
(1− s)k if θi = θ
}
. (1)
Parameter k is therefore the equilibrium fraction of low-cost firms in every
period.
The timing in every period is given by Figure 1. First, the government
allocates permits, qi, to the firms. The firms privately observe their types
9
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Figure 1: Timing of events
before deciding how much to pollute. If a firm chooses xi > qi, it must
purchase xi − qi permits at the equilibrium market price p. If xi < qi, i can
instead sell qi − xi permits. The firms cannot bank their permits from one
period to the next.12 Thus, firm i’s net profit is given by
pii = κ− 1
2
(θi − xi)2 + p (qi − xi) .
While it is costly to abate, it is also costly to pollute. Instead of intro-
ducing citizens in the model, simply let the owner of firm i face a disutility
vx of pollution, where x is the total mass of pollution and v < θ is the value
of clean air. The common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1). Letting the agents
be risk neutral, each i seeks at time τ to maximize its expected discounted
utility
uτi ≡ E
2∑
t=τ
(
piti − vxt
)
δt−1.
Parameters without subscript i represent the average and total value across
the is, such that xt ≡ ∫
I
xtidi and θ ≡ kθ + (1− k) θ.13 Moreover, instead
of always adding superscript t on the parameters, we use superscript ”+” to
label second period variables, and no superscript for the first period.
12Relaxing this assumption would not change the results: Firms do not want to bank
permits in equilibrium.
13For such integrals to exist, we must assume the parameter is piecewise continuous in
i. In equilibrium, it is always possible to order the is such that this is the case.
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2.2. The Planner
The government, or the central planner, seeks at every time t to maxi-
mize the Bergson-Samuelson welfare function w (ut1, u
t
2, ...) . We assume w (.)
is symmetric and strictly concave, i.e., the planner is egalitarian. Following
the literature, and to avoid paternalism, the arguments of w (.) are the ex-
pected discounted utilities of the agents.14 An example of w (.) is generalized
utilitarianism, where the government would maximize w (.) =
∫
ω (ui) di.
15
The government cannot commit to future policies, and we assume it dis-
tributes the permits for free. The latter assumption is empirically reasonable,
as argued in the Introduction (and footnote 2); perhaps due to lobbying or
other political constraints, although we do not model these constraints here.
Moreover, the assumption can be relaxed, since the government would not
benefit by selling or auctioning the permits in equilibrium. This becomes
clear at the end of the next section.
2.3. The Equilibrium Concept
Together with the timing in Figure 1, the game can easily be solved by
backward induction. We look for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
defined by a set of strategies for the firms, xti : H
t → R+, the government,
qti : H
t → R+∀i ∈ I and beliefs Eθti : H t → [0, 1]∀i ∈ I, where H t is the set of
possible histories at time t. To be a PBE, the strategies must be individually
14If, instead, the arguments were the agents’ realized utility, and w were a von-Neumann
Morgenstern utility function, then the welfare function would not be Paretian since the
planner may want to force the firms to take less risk (Hammond, 1981). This argument
goes back to Diamond’s (1967) critique of Harsanyi (1955).
15This particular form, where ui is i’s expected utility and ω
′′ < 0, is recently justified
and axiomatized by Grant et al. (2006).
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rational at every decision node, and beliefs must be consistent with Bayes’
rule, whenever applicable.
Signaling games typically have a large number of PBEs, and we need
refinements. In particular, we rule out equilibria that fail the Intuitive Crite-
rion. Roughly, this implies that if the government observes an emission level
x˜, and this can never be optimal for the low-cost type, then the government
should conclude that the firm has instead high costs, if the high-cost firm,
anticipating this conclusion, would have benefitted from emitting x˜.
Formally, for our two-type game we can restate the definition in Cho
and Kreps (1987, p. 202) as follows. Let uτ∗ (θi) be the expected equilib-
rium continuation payoff at time τ for a firm currently of type θi ∈
{
θ, θ
}
.
Furthermore, let uτ (θi, x˜,E (θi | x˜)) be the set of possible expected continu-
ation payoffs for type θi after taking the out-of-equilibrium action x˜, where
E(θi | x˜) ∈
[
θ, θ
]
represents a possible subsequent belief, and where the other
players play optimally given this belief. If there exists some τ and x˜ such
that, for θ′, θ′′ ∈ {θ, θ}, θ′ 6= θ′′,
uτ∗ (θ
′) > max
E(θi|x˜)
uτ (θ′, x˜,E (θi | x˜)) and
uτ∗ (θ
′′) < minuτ (θ′′, x˜, θ′′) ,
then the equilibrium is said to fail the Intuitive Criterion.
This refinement generates a unique equilibrium; the least costly separat-
ing equilibrium. This equilibrium would survive and continue to be unique if
we replaced PBE by sequential equilibria (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) or the In-
tuitive Criterion by D1 or D2 (for definitions of these concept, see Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1996).
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2.4. Robustness
Although our model is somewhat stylized to make the analysis simple
and the results explicit, it is quite robust. While we start out with a two-
period model, Section 4 shows that the results survive in the multi-period
model. Section 5 discusses other robustness issues, and finds that the re-
sults continue to hold if the concavity of w (.) is relaxed and replaced by (i)
legislative bargaining or (ii) transaction costs. Furthermore, we discuss (iii)
how to relax the Intuitive Criterion, (iv) commitment, (v) heterogeneity, and
(vi) endogenous types. Despite all these possibilities to generalize, we have
deliberately kept the model simple and reader-friendly.
3. The Main Results
3.1. The Last Period
In the last period, each i seeks to maximize u+i or, equivalently, the profit
pi+i . The firm takes p
+ as given and purchases permits until its marginal
benefit of polluting equals the permit price. This equalizes the marginal
benefits (or costs) across firms, and is efficient.
Proposition 1. No matter the initial distribution of quotas, in the last
period marginal costs (2) are equalized across firms and the permit price is
given by (3):
θ+i − x+i = p+ (2)
p+ = θ − q+. (3)
Notice that the allocation of the q+i s, given q
+, does not affect Proposition
1. This is in line with the Coase Theorem, and the 2nd welfare theorem,
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stating that the market equilibrium is efficient no matter the initial property
rights. Tradable permits are celebrated for exactly this reason: ”Because
of this result, the management agency can distribute licenses as it pleases”
(Montgomery, 1972, p. 409).
Given a strictly concave welfare function w, the government prefers to
allocate the permits such as to equalize expected profits. This leads to the
following initial distribution.
Proposition 2. Given q+, the government distributes the permits according
to:
q+i = Eθ
+
i + q
+ − θ. (Q)
In equilibrium, the government gives more permits to firms that are ex-
pected to have high costs. The reason for this is that these firms are going
to pollute a lot, in equilibrium, and they would face a very low profit if they
would have to purchase all the permits they need. Given the government’s
welfare function, it prefers an egalitarian distribution of the profits.
The initial allocation (Q) has a number of interesting properties. First,
notice that it requests every firm to reduce its emission by the exact same
amount (θ − q) compared to what i would be expected to pollute under
business as usual. This leads to an expected profit loss of p2/2, which is the
same for every firm i. Thus, the expected burden is shared equally among
all the firms. This is reasonable: ”One often-invoked principle of equity is
equality of sacrifice”, according to Joskow and Schmalensee (1998, p. 62).16
16Similarly, Hahn and Stavins (1992, p. 466) argue that beyond cost-effectiveness, ”other
legitimate criteria of success should be considered, principal among these being the relative
distributional equity or fairness associated with specific policies”.
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Furthermore, the expected marginal costs are equalized across the firms
under (Q), and this is thus exactly the allocation the government would prefer
if the permits were not tradable. Empirically, this cost-minimizing allocation
is highly correlated with the actual allocation in the U.S. acid rain program:
see Joskow and Schmalensee (1998, p. 61), who also argue that the cost-
minimizing allocation ”is of interest both because of actual and perceived
market imperfections, and because autarchy was implicitly assumed in much
of the actual debate about ”fair” allowance allocations.” Also Noll (1982, p.
122) suggests that one ”basis for the provisional allocation is the estimated
competitive (cost-minimizing) allocation”.
The actual distribution following (Q) depends on the government’s beliefs,
and these are determined by Bayes’ rule in equilibrium. If the equilibrium in
the first period happens to be in separating strategies, the government would
learn a firm’s type θi in period 1, and use this information when calculating
Eθ+i = sθi + (1− s) θ. Substituted in (Q), we can derive the number of
permits distributed to firms that had revealed themselves to have low and
high costs. The difference, ∆ ≡ q−q, increases in the difference in types and
the likelihood that the types will remain the same:
Corollary 1. If the equilibrium is separating in the first period, the initial
allocation is given by:
qi = q ≡ q − s (θ − θ) if θ−i = θ
qi = q ≡ q + s
(
θ − θ) if θ−i = θ
∆ ≡ q − q = s (θ − θ) .S (4)
By substituting q+i in u
+
i , it is straightforward to calculate the optimal
15
q+.
Proposition 3. The government sets
q+ = θ − v. (5)
Combined with (3), we immediately get
p+ = v. (6)
In sum, the government is able to equalize the uis in period 2 while, at
the same time, the uis are maximized since the market is efficient. In a one-
period model, our analysis would end at this point, and we could confirm
the presumption that tradable permits implement the first best. Tradable
permits would also be equivalent to an emission tax of size v if the tax
revenues were redistributed (uniformly or randomly) to the individuals.
3.2. The First Period
Since the market equilibrium in the last period implements the first best,
it is to hope that it coincides with the equilibrium also in the first period.
Observing xi = θi − p and p, the government would learn firm i’s type. In
the second period, the government would then distribute q and q to firms
that had proven to have low and high costs.
Anticipating such an allocation, low-cost firms may be tempted to imitate
the high-cost firms’ strategy in the first period. If imitation is attractive,
polluting θ − p is not a sufficient proof of high costs. Instead, a high-cost
firm must, to signal its type credibly, pollute more than it would otherwise
prefer, thereby separating itself from the low-cost firm.
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By imposing the Intuitive Criterion, the equilibrium will, indeed, be in
separating strategies. This implies that a low-cost firm is never going to
persuade the government to believe that its cost is actually high, and it will
thus set its marginal cost equal to the price of permits, such that θ− x = p.
High cost firms pollute so much that the low cost firms are just indifferent
between x and imitation.
Proposition 4.
(i) There is a unique equilibrium, which is in separating strategies.
(ii) The emission levels are given by (7) for low-cost firms and (8) for high-
cost firms.
(iii) The permit price is given by (9).
x = θ − p (7)
x = θ − p+ r/(1− k) (8)
p = θ − q + r, where (9)
r ≡ max
{
0, (1− k)
(√
2δ∆p+ − [θ − θ])} (10)
> 0 if 2δ∆v >
(
θ − θ)2 .C (11)
Ideally, a high-cost firm would prefer to pollute only θ−θ units more than
the low type, and still gain the value δ∆p+ of ∆ more permits, at the price
p+, discounted by the factor δ since they are received only in the future. For
the low type, the cost of imitating this strategy is
(
θ − θ)2 /2, and if this cost
is larger than the gain δ∆p+, the types separate and there is no need for the
high-cost type to distort its emission. But if
(
θ − θ)2 /2 < δ∆p+, low-cost
firms are tempted to imitate, and to credibly signal a high cost, firms need to
pollute so much that imitation is too costly for low-cost firms. This requires
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(x− θ)2 /2 ≥ δ∆p+, which gives condition (8). Thus, the larger is δ∆p+, the
more the high-cost firms must pollute to signal credibly. This raises demand
for permits, and therefore the price, which ends up being larger than the
average marginal cost. Buying permits has a ”reputational value”, r, which
together with the average marginal cost sums to the equilibrium price.
By combining (7)-(8),
(θ − x)− (θ − x) = r/ (1− k) .
Thus, in addition to measuring the distance between p and the average
marginal cost θ− q, r also measures the difference in marginal costs. Ideally,
marginal costs should be equalized, so r captures how much the market is
distorted.
Substituting (S) and (5) in (10), we can calculate r:
r ≡ max
{
0, (1− k)
(√
2δvs
(
θ − θ)− [θ − θ])}
> 0 if 2δvs > θ − θ.
If types are stable (s large), today’s high cost firms receive many more per-
mits in the future (∆ large). If the problem is severe (v large), the future
permit price is high and the value of getting more permits large. The present
discounted value of more permits is large if the future is close (δ large). Large
v, s and δ are therefore making it more likely that the high-cost firms distort
their emission levels and, if they do, the distortions are greater.
It only remains to calculate the optimal policy in period 1. When the
government has no information about the firms’ types, the uis are equalized
by uniform quotas, qi = q. These quotas, in turn, should be set such that
expected marginal costs equal the value of abatement:
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Proposition 5. In period 1, the optimal number of permits is
q = θ − v. (12)
The total number of permits is thus the same in both periods, even if
trade is distorted in period 1 while being efficient in period 2.17
Substituting the optimal q into the price function (9), we can state the
optimal policy in terms of the price instead of the quantity:
Corollary 4. In period 1, the optimal price of permits is given by:
p = v + r (13)
Thus, p > v whenever (11) holds. The intuition is straightforward: If
the market for permits is distorted, the equilibrium price is higher than the
average marginal cost of reducing pollution. The latter should be equal to
the marginal value, v, which thus must be less than the equilibrium price. It
is therefore wrong, although typically presumed, that the number of quotas
should be such that the price reflects the social value of cleaning. The price
is excessively high because of the reputational effect, and it should thus be
higher than the value of cleaning.
3.3. A Market or Plan for Permits?
The distortions in the market for permits suggest that trade in permits
may not be as efficient as previously thought. But how large are these dis-
tortions, and how important is this problem? Addressing these questions, we
17Although the total cost of cleaning (for each q) is larger in period 1, the marginal cost
with respect to q is the same. This is due to the quadratic profit function, and it simplifies
the comparison to non-tradable permits in the next section. In general, the optimal q
could be larger or smaller if trade is allowed or if trade is inefficient. This would depend
on the profit function.
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now compare the distortions to the gains from trade, and find conditions
under which prohibiting trade is actually better.
In the last period, the market is efficient and implements the first best.
This is obviously not true if quotas are non-tradable, since the government
does not know the realized types when distributing the quotas. Thus, trade is
always recommended for the last period. The first period market is distorted,
however, if (11) holds. In fact,
Proposition 6. If (11) holds, there is too much trade in permits.
It is easy to show that the optimal q is given by (12), even if the per-
mits are not tradable.18 When allocating the permits in the first period,
the government has no information about the firms, and it prefers to give
everyone the same number of permits. Since x > x in equilibrium, high-cost
firms have to buy permits from low-cost firms. Prohibiting trade prevents
low-cost firms from optimally selling their permits to high-cost firms. But it
also prevents high-cost firms from costly signaling their types.19 When can
it be that the costs of signaling (area A in Figure 2) outweigh the gains from
trade (area B)? The condition turns out to be simple and intuitive.
Proposition 7. Permits should be tradable if and only if:
2
(
θ − θ)2 ≥ δ∆p+. (14)
18Simply maximize κ− k (θ − q)2 /2− (1− k) (θ − q)2 /2− vq w.r.t. q.
19The result that there will be too much trade holds because the equilibrium is in
separating strategies, which is due to the Intuitive Criterion. Without that, Section 5.3
argues that the equilibrium can be in pooling strategies, implying too little trade, while
the other results of the paper continue to hold.
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Figure 2: If the social cost of signaling (A) is larger than the gains from trade (B), trade
should be prohibited (the figure presumes k=1/2).
If (11) does not hold, trade is first-best and (14) always holds. Otherwise,
r > 0 and the market is distorted. That is, of course, not a sufficient condition
for prohibiting trade. The distortions from signaling must be compared to
the cost of uniform emission quotas, and this gives condition (14).
Substituting (S) and (6) in (14), trade is good if and only if
2
(
θ − θ) ≥ δsv.
The cost of uniform quotas is, naturally, increasing in the heterogeneity(
θ − θ), making trade relatively better. But the incentives to signal high
costs increase in δ, s and p+ = v, and so do the distortions from trade. Thus,
if the future is close (δ large), the types stable (s large) and the future value
of permits (v) high , it is very tempting to signal high costs and the result-
ing distortions are higher than the cost of uniform standards. Therefore,
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trade is good only if
(
θ − θ) is large while δ, s and v are small. Note that
if the problem is more important (in that v is large), permits should not be
tradable.
Remark: While we have assumed that the government compensates high-
cost firms in the form of more permits, the results would be identical if the
compensation took the form of cash or some other good instead. As is clear
from our analysis, it is the monetary value of ∆ that generates the distortions,
not the quotas per se. If e.g. the government would sell the permits, it would
prefer to redistribute the revenues such as to equalize the uis, the optimal
price would be v + r and the subsequent market would be inefficient under
(C). Moreover, since there is no private information in equilibrium at the
time when the government allocates the permits, it cannot benefit from using
another allocation method or incentive scheme.
4. Multiple Periods
The two-period model can easily be extended to an infinite number of
periods. Superscript ”+” and ”-” are added to all parameters representing
the next and the previous period, respectively (this way, we do not need
superscripts for periods). Firm types follow the Markov process (1) where
firm i is low-cost with a probability that depends on its type in the previous
period. While the model itself can stay unchanged, the equilibrium concept
must be refined. In dynamic games, as in repeated games, there are typi-
cally a large number of equilibria (based on various ”Folk theorems”), even
when restricting attention to PBEs satisfying the Intuitive Criterion. As is
common, we restrict attention to Markov Perfect Equilibria (as defined by
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Maskin and Tirole, 2001). This implies that firms’ strategies depend on the
history only to the extent it is reflected in today’s total number of permits,
q.20
A firm’s problem is then quite simple. Just as in Section 3.2, a firm
maximizes current profit, only taking into account how its decisions affect
the government’s beliefs for the following period. This problem is solved in
the proof of Proposition 4, which continues to hold.
Since the firms’ strategies do not depend on the q in any earlier period,
the government chooses q understanding that its level will have no impact
on future periods. The optimal q is thus just as derived in Proposition 5,
which continues to hold. Proposition 6 and 7 continue to hold as well, since
their proofs build on Propositions 4 and 5.21 To summarize:
Proposition 8. In every period, the equilibrium x, x, p and q are given by
(7), (8), (9) and (12), respectively. Propositions 4-7 continue to hold.
In contrast to the two period model, the infinite period model generates
distortions in every period. Thus, in a given period, the future price is given
by p+ = v + r rather than by p+ = v as in the two-period model. p is a
function of r, which is a function of p+. It turns out to be a unique fixed
point for p.
20Historic levels of q or xi are not ”payoff relevant” in that they do not affect a firm’s
relative preference for any future xi, taking as given the other players’ future xj and
q. Even the government’s beliefs are not payoff relevant when, in line with the proof of
Proposition 4, the unique equilibrium is in separating strategies.
21It is only the proof of Proposition 6 that needs a minor modification, since the quotas
are not distributed uniformly when the equilibrium was separating in the previous period.
By letting ”x∗ > max{q, q}” replace ”x∗ > qi = q”, the proof continues to be true.
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Proposition 9. There are unique equilibrium values for p = p+ and r,
where p is given by p = v + r and r is given by:
r = max
{
0, (1− k)
( √
2δ∆v − (θ − θ)2 + [θ − θ − δ∆ (1− k)]2
− [θ − θ − δ∆ (1− k)]
)}
(15)
> 0 if (C) holds.
The condition for r > 0 is, again, given by (11). Moreover, r increases
in δ and ∆ but decreases in q,
(
θ − θ) and k, just as before.22 But if (C)
does hold, r and p are larger than in the two-period model. The reason is
that if e.g. v is so large that the reputational value of purchasing permits is
positive, it increases r directly and thus p, but it also increases p+ and then,
again, r. If there are distortions, these are greater than when there were only
two periods.
So far, this section has taken ∆ as given. This was possible, since all
results in Section 3.2 were presented as if ∆ were a primitive. Of course, ∆
is endogenous and, in the two period model, it was given by (4). Is that so,
also in the infinite period model?
When the government maximizes w by distributing the permits, it prefers
22This is most easily seen by writing
r = max
{
0, (1− k)
(√
w + y2 − y
)}
, where
w ≡ 2δ∆v − (θ − θ)2 and
y ≡ θ − θ − δ∆ (1− k) .
Clearly, r increases in w but decreases in y, giving the comparative static discussed above.
Under (S), however, one can show that r is hump-shaped in
(
θ − θ), such that r increases
initially in
(
θ − θ): When the heterogeneity is very small (and approaching zero), ∆ =
s
(
θ − θ) makes r small (and approaching zero).
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to equalize expected profits, conditional on its beliefs about the firms’ types.
Moreover, the government’s expectation of the profits depends on its under-
standing of the market. One may argue that the government should have
rational expectations, taking into account the distortions that are going to
take place. One the other hand, one of the claimed contributions of the
present paper is pointing to these distortions. Thus, one could also argue
that the government is naive and does not anticipate any distortions (as in
Moledina et al., 2003).
Proposition 10. (i) If the government expects the market to be efficient,
∆ = s
(
θ − θ) as in (4). (ii) If the government has rational expectations, ∆
is set according to (S˜) below.
∆ = s
[(
θ − θ)+ r2
2 (v + r) (1− k)2
]
(S˜)
Rational expectations increase ∆ when r > 0, since the egalitarian gov-
ernment prefers to compensate the high-cost firms for the costs of signalling
these firms must bear. Anticipating the larger ∆, the temptation to signal
high costs increases and the market becomes even more distorted. Since r in-
creases in ∆, which in turn increases in r, the comparative statics, discussed
above, are strengthened. It is still true, for example, that a larger v makes
it more likely that non-tradable permits are better, as in Proposition 7, but
with rational expectations in the dynamic model, it is even more likely that
nontradable permits are good, for any given v.23
23Although r is a function of ∆, r(∆), and ∆ is a function of r, ∆ (r′), r is still not
exploiding because the composite function, r (∆ (r′)), has the derivative δs/2 < 1 in the
limit as r′ →∞.
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5. Robustness and Extensions
5.1. Legislative Bargaining
Above, we assumed the government’s social welfare function w were strictly
concave. This motivated the egalitarian distribution of the qis and thus
∆ > 0. It is easy to endogenize the government’s preference for an equal
distribution of utilities. Take a political economy approach, for example.
Instead of assuming a single egalitarian decision-maker, let each firm be
represented by a legislator, negotiating on its behalf (like in Joskow and
Schmalensee, 1998).24 The legislators negotiate every policy discussed above
(such as q, the qis, and whether permits should be tradable). Suppose the
legislators have no private information on the firms’ types, and let the out-
come be characterized by the Nash bargaining solution, where the default
outcome is no regulation.
Proposition 11. Assume policies are determined by legislative bargaining
rather than an egalitarian benevolent planner. Every result above continues
to hold.
5.2. Market Imperfections and Transaction Costs
Our results are stated in terms of ∆, and they hold for any ∆ ≥ 0, even
if the specification (S) is not satisfied. Thus, the results are quite general
and consistent with various reasons for why the government prefers to give
24Tietenberg (2006, p. 129) writes that ”negotiation was an important element” of the
US Sulfur Allowance Program. In the EU, ”the allocation process can best be described
as an extended dialogue between the government and industry” (Ellerman et al., 2007, p.
344).
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more permits to high-cost firms. In addition to an egalitarian government,
or legislative bargaining, there are other reasons to expect ∆ ≥ 0.
Suppose the government is utilitarian, such that it simply maximizes the
sum of utilities. Then, the initial distribution of the permits, the qis, does not
seem to matter for the government. ”Not so, potentially, in the presence of
transaction costs”, is the reply of Stavins (1995, p. 143). Hahn and Stavins
(1992, p. 465) notice that ”transaction costs in tradable permit markets can
be substantial”, creating an ”efficiency justification for politicians’ typical
focus on initial allocation” (Stavins, 1995, p. 133). For the US SO2 market,
Carlson et al. (2000, p. 1319) found that ”many participants opted out of
the market”. To capture such market imperfections in a simple way, assume
that, with probability  > 0, → 0, a firm does not participate in the permit
market. Segal (1999, p. 340) uses a similar assumption and suggests the
offer ”may be lost in the mail.” Alternatively, managers may be time or
credit-constrained, they may not succeed in matching with a buyer/seller, or
the mere transfer of permits could entail prohibiting transaction costs. To
simplify further, assume that firms cannot pretend they were unable to find
a trading partner.
Proposition 12. Suppose w is utilitarian but, with probability ,  → 0,
firms do not trade. Propositions 1-9 continue to hold and the initial allocation
is given by (Q) and (S).
While a utilitarian government would be indifferent to the initial alloca-
tion of the qis in a perfect market, small imperfections break the tie. With
even the slightest chance that the firms will not trade, it is strictly preferable
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for the government to allocate the permits such that expected marginal costs
are equalized. This gives the initial allocation (Q), which implies (S), since
the firms’ strategies remain the same. Thus, (S) holds whether the number
of periods is two or infinite, no matter whether the government has rational
expectations or believes the firms will trade non-strategically.
5.3. Pooling
Our unique equilibrium, and the result that it is in separating strategies,
rely on the Intuitive Criterion. Imposing this criterion may be reasonable,
particularly because we otherwise would have a very large number of equilib-
ria.25 In particular, without imposing the Intuitive Criterion, one may have
equilibria in pooling strategies where every firm pollutes the same amount.
This can be supported if the government interprets any deviation as evidence
of low cost. Low-cost firms are then willing to pollute just as much as high
cost firms, since they otherwise would be given smaller quotas in the future.
In this equilibrium, Proposition 6 would be reversed: There would be too
little trade. However, the other results would survive, qualitatively: The
market for permits is distorted and not efficient, and this is more likely to
happen if the permits are distributed frequently (such that δ and s are high).
If we stick to the two-period model, it is easy to investigate when a pooling
equilibrium exists in the first period:
25Nevertheless, the Intuitive Criterion is sometimes criticized because it implies that
high-cost firms undertake costly signaling even when almost all firms have high cost (see
e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 110). For this reason, the separating equilibrium
in e.g. Spence’s (1973) labor market may be Pareto-dominated by a pooling equilibrium
where no-one undertakes costly education. This critique, however, has no bite in the
present model: By combining (7)-(C) and (12), as k → 1, r → 0, and almost all firms
pollute optimally. Similarly, as k → 0, x→ θ − v, and almost all firms pollute optimally.
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Proposition 13. Relaxing the Intuitive Criterion, a pooling equilibrium
exists with xi = qi = θ − v and no trade if and only if:
δsv ≥ θ − θ
8 (1− k) . (16)
The intuition is as before: If the problem is important (v large) while the
stability of types and the discount factor are large, low cost firms are getting
far less quotas in the next period, the value of future permits is large and
the future is important. In these circumstances, firms are reluctant to reveal
low costs, and the market is thus distorted. If heterogeneity is sufficiently
large, however, it is too costly for different firms to pool on the same strategy.
Proposition 13 does not specify the price p, since there may be a range of
prices supporting the pooling equilibrium.
5.4. Commitment
The key assumption in our analysis is that the government cannot commit
to future allocations of the quotas. Then, whenever the government has the
slightest concern for fairness, transaction costs or the representatives’ bar-
gaining power, more permits are given to high cost firms. If the government
is distributing the permits frequently, this creates distortions in the market.
But what if the government can commit? It may write statutes or do-
mestic laws specifying how the permits ought to be allocated in the future as
an arbitrary function of the history. It may also be bound by international
climate agreements. If the government can commit to future allocation rules,
it is much easier to obtain efficiency.
In particular, take the legislative bargaining model in Section 5.1, and
suppose the legislators, before learning anything about their local firm, com-
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mit to the uniform rule qi = q no matter what should happen subsequently.
Since firms cannot affect their future qis, they maximize current profit as in
Section 3.1. The market is efficient and, to maximize expected utility, every
legislator agree on q = θ− v. The first best is thus implemented. Note, how-
ever, that the rule does require pre-commitment. After a legislator learns
that its local firm has a high cost, it is tempted to initiate renegotiation and
demand more permits.
With commitment, the first best is also easily implemented for the model
in Section 5.2, where there are tiny market imperfections and a utilitarian
government. By committing to qi = q, the market is efficient unless it, with
probability , fails to work. The sum of expected utilities is also maximized,
so the first best is achieved in the limit as → 0.
However, if the government is egalitarian, as in Sections 2-4, it is not
satisfied with a uniform distribution of quotas after learning that the expected
costs do vary. The first best, in this situation, requires both efficiency and
that expected profits are equalized across firms. Efficiency requires low and
high cost firms to pollute x∗ = θ − v and x∗ = θ − v. Equalizing expected
profit requires such firms to be rewarded with q and q in the next period. In
Section 3, the prospects of q induced high cost firms to pollute more than
optimal. Suppose the government commits to not reward such behavior and,
instead, that it allows the firm to only pollute x∗ or x∗. As explained above,
this is not separating the types if the permit price is p = v when (11) holds.
Low cost firms are then induced to imitate the high cost firms by polluting
x∗. When q = kx∗ + (1− k)x∗ is given, this increases the market price for
permits until the point at which no low cost firm find it attractive to imitate
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high cost firms.
At this price, neither type sets marginal costs equal to the price, and it
is thus crucial that the firms are indeed unable to choose emissions different
from {x∗, x∗}.26
Proposition 14. If the government can commit, the first best is implemented
by the following allocation rule:
If x−i = x
∗ = θ − v, qi = q
If x−i = x
∗ = θ − v, qi = q.
The equilibrium price is any
p ∈
[
v − (θ − θ) /2
1− δs ,
v +
(
θ − θ) /2
1− δs
]
.
It is easy to see that if (11) holds, p > v. Thus, the equilibrium price
must still be larger than the social marginal value of abatement and the
private marginal cost of abating, under the very same condition as before.
Imitation is unattractive for the low type only if the price is above the lower
threshold. At the upper threshold, the price is so high that it is actually the
high cost type that prefers to imitate the low cost type. Any price between
these thresholds satisfy both types’ incentive constraints and the equilibrium
is separating. When δ and s increase, both thresholds for p become larger,
and p must increase, just as before.27
26The proposition assumes that any x 6= {x∗, x∗} is prohibitively costly. However, if the
government can only threaten to give zero quotas after such a choice, we should also add
an incentive constraint for each type to ensure it does not prefer to maximize static profit
by setting xi = θi − p. One can show that these incentive constraints do not bind if θ is
sufficiently large.
27In principle, the government may want to commit by using particular benchmarks for
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5.5. Heterogeneity
Throughout this paper we have assumed that firms are identical, except
for their type θi. However, allowing for observable heterogeneity in e.g. κ
would not affect the results. Moreover, suppose that k were known to vary
across firms. Then, q and q may as well vary across firms and should be
written qi and qi. The results above would be identical if just qi−qi were the
same for all firms. This would actually be the case (using (Q)), implying that
(4), and thus all the results, would continue to hold. If firms were of different
sizes, to give another example, we could simply let the profit function and
all the variables above be measured per unit of capital (or firm size). The
results above would be unaffected.
We have also simplified by assuming each firm to be associated with
exactly one owner. More generally, one could let αij measure individual i’s
ownership of firm j. As is easy to show, all results continue to hold if just∑
i αij =
∑
j αij = 1.
5.6. Endogenous Types
While firm types are exogenous in our model, endogenizing θi would
strengthen our results. Suppose that firm i can make some investment that
affects its probability of becoming a low-cost firm. A successful investment
implies that the firm is penalized in the form of a smaller initial quota, with
an immediate effect if the outcome is observable. Thus, the firm has too
calculating the initial allocation. In practice, however: ”In no aspect of the allocation
process for the EU ETS was the disparity between advocacy and practice greater than for
benchmarking” (Ellerman et al., 2007, p. 351). This suggest that commitments were not
that easy, after all.
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low incentives to reduce its cost of cleaning or, equivalently, it has too high
incentives to pollute. The more frequently the government intervenes, the
more these incentives are distorted (as in Pint, 1992).
6. Conclusions
Tradable pollution permits are celebrated as a policy instrument. They
supposedly combine the efficient features of a market with the government’s
concern for the distributive impacts. We show, however, that these two goals
conflict in a dynamic setting when we take political constraints into account.
Anticipating the government’s concern for redistribution, the permit price
is above marginal costs of cleaning, and trade is distorted. The distortions
are larger if the government redistributes frequently and if the value of the
permits is large.
To be precise, let T be the number of years within each period, meaning
that the government redistributes permits only every T year. Parameter
v measures the shadow value of permits, e.g. the social value of reducing
emission. Our main results are illustrated in Figure 3: Trade is first-best in
area FB, while in area DIST, there is distorting signaling. Since the curves
are upward-sloping, Figure 3 shows that if v is larger, T must be larger
to prevent distortions. In words, for important environmental problems, the
government should commit to not intervene in the market for a larger number
of years. Otherwise, we may enter area BAD where the distortions are larger
than the gains from trade, and it is actually better to prohibit trade.28
28Formally, δ = δTa if δa is the annual discount factor. Substituting this, and the number
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Figure 3: The larger the value of cleaning, v, the larger the period length, T, should be.
Theoretically, the analysis provides lessons for the old debate on plan ver-
sus markets. While a perfect market would be first-best in our setting (with
no redistribution), frequent intervention distorts the market allocation. The
more often the government intervenes, the worse the market performs. At
some point, it is better to abandon the market altogether and rely completely
on command-and-control, prohibiting trade in permits. This suggests that
efficiency, as a function of regulatory intervention, may be U-shaped. Mixing
plan and market might be worse than either. Our analysis also illustrates
of permits q = θ − v into (11) and (14) gives two equations (when the inequalities bind)
for v as functions of T :
v1 =
(
θ − θ)2 /2δT∆,
v2 = z
′2/δT − z′(1− k)
√
2∆ + (1− k) (θ − θ) where
z′ =
(
θ − θ)√2/∆ > z.
The inverse of these functions are drawn from the left to the right in the figure. Similar
results can be derived assuming (S) and s = sTa .
34
that the first and the second welfare theorems may conflict in a dynamic
setting.29
But the analysis is not only of theoretical interest. Permit markets are
used for fish catch and various environmental problems. Currently, they are
becoming increasingly important in mitigating global climate change, and
it is thus immensely important to understand the dynamic effects of such
markets. Our model is consistent with several features of the ETS market in
the EU. As documented in the Introduction, governments do distribute the
permits periodically, they are typically distributed for free, projections are
used but the government has imperfect information on future needs. Based
on these features, our model explains why the market for permits may not be
as efficient as previously thought. More recently, the EU has recommended to
use auctioning to a larger extent, consistent with the policy recommendations
of this paper.
Of course, our simple framework has many shortcomings. Empirically,
the model’s predictions should be tested when more data becomes available.
Theoretically, we have simply assumed a benevolent government, and we have
not formalized why the government is unable to commit to future policies.
Future research should formalize how voters and the political institutions
29While the first welfare theorem states that the market equilibrium is first-best, the
second states that any market equilibrium can be achieved by a proper reallocation of
initial endowments. This is sometimes interpreted as suggesting that the combination
of plan and markets can achieve remarkable outcomes, both in terms of efficiency and
equality. This is not true when the plan is based on manipulable characteristics (see e.g.
Roberts, 1984). If, in our model, the distributions of permits were based on the firms’
past types (which are non-manipulable), there would be no distortions. However, the
distributions are based on the expectation over types, and these are manipulable by the
firms.
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determine the politicians’ preferences and their possibilities to commit. De-
riving optimal and equilibrium policies, given these constraints, may bring
us closer to the best possible environmental regulation.
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Appendix A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 : At t = 2, each i solves
max
x+i
κ− 1
2
(
θ+i − x+i
)2
+ p+
(
q+i − x+i
)− vq+.
While the second-order condition is trivially fulfilled, the first-order condition
is
θ+i − x+i = p+ ⇒
∫
I
(
θ+i − x+i
)
di = θ − q+ =
∫
I
p+di = p+. (A.1)
A firm or individual cannot affect the total level of emission, since x+ = q+.
Proof of Proposition 2 : At the beginning of period 2, the government max-
imizes w by choosing q+i ∀i ∈ I, anticipating that (2) implies pi+i = κ +
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(p+)
2
/2 + p+
(
q+i − θ+i
)
. The problem can be solved in two stages, first by
choosing the q+i s given q
+ (thereafter by choosing q+). The optimal q+i s must
solve:
max
{qi}
w
({
Epi+i − vq+
}
i
)
s.t.
∫
I
q+i di = q
+.
Since every
(
∂w/∂
(
Epi+i
))
p+ must equal the Lagrange multiplier and w is
symmetric, it follows that E
(
θ+i − q+i
)
must be the same for all is. Since they
must sum to θ − q+, (Q) follows.
Proof of Proposition 4 : We first prove (ii). If the equilibrium is separating,
a low-cost firm does not want to imitate high-cost firms and it will receive
q in the next period. Since a firm can never get less than q under (Q), low
cost firms must pollute such that:
x = arg max
x
(
p(q − x)− (θ − x)2 /2 + δqp+) = θ − p.
Let x represent the equilibrium pollution level of a high cost firm. The pair
(x, x) fails the Intuitive Criterion (for its general definition, see Cho and
Kreps, 1987) if there exists another alternative x′ which is (i) always worse
for the low-cost firm (even if it should lead to a quota q in the next period),
but (ii) strictly better for the high-cost firm if just the government believes
E(θi|x′) = θ, which would lead to q. Formally, (x, x) fails the Intuitive
Criterion if
x 6= arg max
x
(
p(qi − x)−
(
θ − x)2 /2 + δqp+) s.t.
p(qi − x)− (θ − x)2 /2 + δqp+ > p(qi − x)− (θ − x)2 /2 + δqp+. (A.2)
If (A.2) does not bind for xn,
xn ≡ arg max
x
(
p(qi − x)−
(
θ − x)2 /2 + δqp+) = θ − p,
x must equal xn. But if xn does not satisfy (A.2), a separating x cannot
pass the Intuitive Criterion unless (A.2) binds with equality, implying the
emission level:
xb = θ − p+
√
(θ − p)2 − ((θ − p)2 − 2δ∆p+) = θ − p+√2δ∆p+.
Clearly, xb > xn if
√
2δ∆p+ > θ−θ, and then xn cannot satisfy (A.2). Hence,
x = max{xn, xb}, giving (8).
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(iii) Using (7) and (8), q = x = kx+ (1− k)x = θ − p+ r ⇒(9).
(i) From the proof of (ii), there is a unique separating equilibrium. Sup-
pose there also were a pooling or a semi-pooling equilibrium where some
firms of both types polluted x′. From Bayes’ rule, E(θi | x′) < θ, and from
(Q), their future quota would be q′ ≡ q+Eθi − θ < q. Since θ > θ, it is
always possible to find x′′ > x′ such that
p(qi − x′′)− (θ − x′′)2 /2 + δqp+ < p(qi − x′)− (θ − x′)2 /2 + δq′p+(A.3)
p(qi − x′′)−
(
θ − x′′)2 /2 + δqp+ > p(qi − x′)− (θ − x′)2 /2 + δq′p+.
The first inequality implies that a deviation to x′′ is never optimal for the
low-cost type. (ii) The second inequality says that a deviation to q′′ is optimal
for the high-cost firm if the government concludes E(θi | x′′) = θ, such that
its future quota is q. Hence, the equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof of Proposition 5 : Since Eθi = θ for every i, w is maximized by setting
qi = q∀i and thereafter by maximizing ui, which thus is the same for all
is. Since the u+i s are independent of the qis, we can simply maximize i’s
expected payoff in period 1,
κ− k (θ − x)2 /2− (1− k) (θ − x)2 /2− vq.
From (7)-(10), ∂x/∂q = ∂x/∂q = −1, and the first-order condition is:
k (θ − x) + (1− k) (θ − x)− v = 0⇒ (12).
Proof of Proposition 6 : In the first-best outcome,
θ − x∗ = θ − x∗ = θ − q − (1− k)x
∗
k
⇒ x∗ = q + k (θ − θ) .
Since x∗ > qi = q, high-cost firms should purchase permits. In equilibrium
(from (8)):
x = q + θ − θ + rk/(1− k) = q + k (θ − θ)+ rk/(1− k),
which is larger than x∗ under (11). Thus, high-cost firms are purchasing more
permits in equilibrium than what is socially optimal. Equivalently, low-cost
firms sell more permits than what is optimal.
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Proof of Proposition 7 : Since q is the same under both regimes, we need only
to compare firms’ total (or expected) profit. Without trade, these are:
E
(
κ− (θi − q)2 /2
)
= κ− Eθ2i /2 + θq − q2/2. (A.4)
Suppose (11) holds. With trade, note that x − x = √2δp+∆ and x = q
implies
x = q − (1− k)
√
2δp+∆, x = q + k
√
2δp+∆.
Thus, summing the piis gives:
κ− k (θ − x)2 /2− (1− k) (θ − x)2 /2
= κ− k
(
θ − q + (1− k)
√
2δp+∆
)2
/2− (1− k)
(
θ − q − k
√
2δp+∆
)2
/2
= κ− Eθ2i /2 + θq − q2/2 + k (1− k)
√
2δp+∆
[(
θ − θ)−√δp+∆/2] .(A.5)
Compared to (A.4), trade is good if and only if
k (1− k)
√
2δp+∆
(
θ − θ) ≥ k (1− k) δp+∆⇒ (14).
If (11) does not hold, trade is first best. (14) always hold in this case.
Proof of Proposition 9 : Since q is constant over time, p follows from
p = max
{
θ − q, θ − q + (1− k)√2δ∆p+}, which is an increasing function of
p+. To prevent p from exploding, p = p+, and we should look for a fixed
point in this equation. There are two possibilities. First, it may be that
p = θ − q if θ − q ≥ θ − q + (1− k)√2δ∆p+. Then, p+ = p = θ − q implies:
θ − q ≥ θ − q + (1− k)
√
2δ∆ (θ − q)⇒ ∼ (11).
Second, it may be that θ − q < θ − q + (1 − k)√2δ∆p+, such that p equals
the latter. Solving for
√
p =
√
p+ > 0 gives:
√
p = (1− k)
√
δ∆/2 +
√
(1− k)2δ∆/2 + θ − q. (A.6)
Requiring θ − q < θ − q + (1− k)√2δ∆p+ implies
kθ + (1− k)θ − q <
θ − q + (1− k)
[
(1− k)δ∆ + δ∆
√
(1− k)2 + 2 (θ − q) /δ∆
]
⇒
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θ − θ < (1− k)δ∆ + δ∆
√
(1− k)2 + 2 [θ − q − (1− k) (θ − θ)] /δ∆⇒[
θ − θ − (1− k)δ∆]2 < (1−k)2 (δ∆)2+2 [θ − q − (1− k) (θ − θ)] δ∆⇒ (11).
Thus, (11)⇔(A.6), while p = θ − q if (11) does not hold. Both equilibria
(with and without r > 0) cannot exist for the same parameter values. It just
remains to calculate r under (11). From (A.6):
p = (1− k)2δ∆/2 + (1− k)δ∆
√
(1− k)2 + 2 (θ − q) /δ∆
+
[
(1− k)2δ∆/2 + θ − q]
= (1− k)2δ∆ + θ − q + (1− k)δ∆
√
(1− k)2 + 2 (θ − q) /δ∆
= θ − q + r, where
r = (1− k)2δ∆− (1− k) (θ − θ)+ (1− k)δ∆√(1− k)2 + 2 (θ − q) /δ∆
⇒ (15).
Proof of Proposition 10: When firms use Markov strategies, the qis affect the
firms strategies neither today, nor in the future. Thus, ∂ui/∂qi = p∀i, and
utility is transferable. The government maximizes
max
{qi}
w (u1, u2, ...) s.t.
∫
I
qidi = q,
implying that every (∂w/∂ui) (∂ui/∂qi) = (∂w/∂ui) p = λ, if λ is the La-
grange multiplier. Thus, every ui must be the same. Since ui =Epii −
vq+Eδu+i and the government equalizes Eδu
+
i in the next period, it is enough
to equalize the Epiis this period. (i) If the government believes the firms are
going to pollute optimally, as in Section 3.1, its problem is exactly as solved
in the proof of Propositions 2 and 3, and so are the qis and thus ∆. (ii) With
rational expectations, the government uses (7)-(8) and anticipates
E
(
pii|θ−i = θ
)
= (s+ (1− s) k)ψ + (1− s) (1− k)ψ + pqi,
E
(
pij|θ−j = θ
)
= (1− s) kψ + (1− (1− s) k)ψ + pqj, where
ψ ≡ κ− p2/2− p (θ − p) and
ψ ≡ κ− (θ − x)2 /2− px
= κ− (p− r/ (1− k))2 /2− p (θ − p+ r/(1− k))
= κ+ p2/2− r2/2 (1− k)2 − pθ,
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are the gross profits for low and high cost firms, ignoring their revenues from
selling their permits. Since
ψ − ψ = r2/2 (1− k)2 + p (θ − θ) ,
E
(
pii|θ−i = θ
)
=E
(
pij|θ−j = θ
)
requires
p (qj − qi) = s
(
ψ − ψ) = s [r2/2 (1− k)2 + p (θ − θ)] ,
which gives (S˜) since ∆ = qj − qi when Eθ−i = θ and Eθ−j = θ.
Proof of Proposition 11 : Suppose, for a moment, there is a finite number
of firms, n, and their representatives are bargaining at stage one in every
period. The Nash bargaining solution is the argmax of the Nash Product,
I (ui − ςi) s.t.
∑
I
qi/n = q, where
ui = Epii − vq + Eδu+i and
ςi ≡ κ− vθ + Eδu+i
is legislator i’s default utility. Since the permit allocation makes utilities
transferable, the equilibrium qis make every ui the same. Anticipating that
this is true also in the future, Eδu+i is the same across the i’s and, thus,
every Epii must be the same. The allocation of the qis is thus as in Sections
3 and 4. Given this, every legislator prefers to maximize the same ui, and
they agree on the (optimal) q and whether trade is good or not. Clearly, the
argument also when n→∞.
Proof of Proposition 12 : With probability (1− ), firms trade and, then,∫
I
piidi is independent of the qis, for q given. Thus, when the government
solves:
max
{qi}i
E
∫
I
[

(
κ− (θi − qi)2/2
)
+ (1− ) pii
]
di− vq s.t. q =
∫
I
qidi,
the first-order condition is that every (θi − qi) must equal the Lagrange
multiplier. This gives (Q) and thus (S).
Proof of Proposition 13 : If the equilibrium is fully pooling, every firm pollutes
the same, no information is revealed, and every initial quota is the same.
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The belief most likely to support this equilibrium is that any deviation is
interpreted as a signal of low costs, and such a firm is, in the next period,
allocated qi = q = sθ + (1− s) θ − v instead of q = θ − v which is optimal
in the pooling equilibrium. If deviating, xi = θi − p would be optimal. High
cost firms do not find a one-period deviation optimal if
κ− (θ − q)2 /2 + δp+s (θ − θ) ≥ κ− p2/2− p (θ − p− q)⇒
δp+s (1− k) (θ − θ) ≥ p2/2− p (θ − q)+ (θ − q)2 /2
= p2/2− p (θ − θ + v)+ (θ − θ + v)2 /2
= (p− v)2 /2− (p− v) k (θ − θ)+ k2 (θ − θ)2 /2.
Similarly, low cost firms do not find deviation attractive if
κ− (θ − q)2 /2 + δp+s (θ − θ) ≥ κ− p2/2− p (θ − p− q)⇒
δp+s (1− k) (θ − θ) ≥ p2/2− p (θ − q) + (θ − q)2 /2
= p2/2− p (θ − θ + v) + (θ − θ + v)2 /2
= (p− v)2 /2 + (p− v) (1− k) (θ − θ)+ (1− k)2 (θ − θ)2 /2
Combined,
δp+s (1− k) (θ − θ) ≥ (p− v)2 /2− (p− v) k (θ − θ)+ k2 (θ − θ)2 /2
+ max
{
0, (p− v) (θ − θ)+ (1− 2k) (θ − θ)2 /2} .
The p minimizing the right-hand side is p = v+
(
θ − θ) (k − 1/2). This makes
the right-hand side equal to
(
θ − θ)2 [(k − 1/2)2 /2− k (k − 1/2) + k2/2] =(
θ − θ)2 /8. Substituting p+ = v for the second period concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 14: For low and high cost firms, the first best requires
x∗ = θ − v and x∗ = θ − v, leading to the gross profits:
ψ∗ = κ− v2/2− p (θ − v)
ψ
∗
= κ− v2/2− p (θ − v)
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Maximizing w requires expected profits to be equalized. Thus, if i had proven
to have high cost while j had proven to have low cost in the previous period,
qi−qj = s
(
θ − θ) as in Section 3.1. The incentive constraint for the low-cost
type is:
ψ∗ ≥ κ− (θ − θ + v)2 /2− p (θ − v)+ δp+∆⇒
p− δsp+ ≥ v − (θ − θ) /2.
The incentive constraint for the high-cost type is
ψ
∗
+ δp+∆ ≥ κ− (θ − θ + v)2 /2− p (θ − v)⇒
p− δsp+ ≤ v + (θ − θ) /2.
Setting p = p+ and requiring both incentive constraints to hold concludes
the proof.
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